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“[I]f a team of top-flight engineers had been assigned to build an 
instrument for the quick and effective flooding of New Orleans; they 
could not have come up with a better design than the [Mississippi River 
Gulf Outlet].” – Douglas Brinkley1  
ABSTRACT 
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 to provide a legal remedy 
to citizens for torts committed by the Federal Government. Prior to the act, 
United States citizens were mostly prohibited from filing suits against the 
government for torts committed by government employees. However, Congress 
when passing the act realized that some government actions are the result of 
considered policy judgment for what is in the best interest of the citizenry as a 
whole. In order to prevent the government from being sued for such actions, 
Congress included what is referred to as the Discretionary Function Exception. If 
a government employee’s action falls within the parameters of the Discretionary 
Function Exception the government is immune from tort liability. This Article 
argues that courts have interpreted the Discretionary Function too broadly such 
that it now excuses the government from egregious unjustifiable harms to the 
American public. 
 The Article explores this topic using a recent example in which the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a confused opinion, denied relief to victims of 
Hurricane Katrina. Even though the Army Corps of Engineers—who is 
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responsible for a navigational canal found to be the cause of multiple levee 
breaches—admitted wrongdoing, the Fifth Circuit used the broad application of 
the Discretionary Function Exception to deny liability for the government. After 
reviewing the jurisprudential history of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the Article 
argues that a doctrinal application of the Discretionary Function Exception 
should find that the government is not immune from liability. Finally, the Article 
reviews the purposes and policy justifications for tort law and concludes that the 
only just result in the Hurricane Katrina case is a finding of liability. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast of the United States when it made 
landfall on August 29, 2005. The storm killed 1,836 people, cost an estimated 
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$110 billion, and destroyed or otherwise made uninhabitable 275,000 homes.2 
Many people who were following the events initially believed that the damage 
caused by the storm was solely the result of Katrina’s unprecedented power.3 In 
the months and years that followed, however, it became clear that this was a 
manmade disaster created by a levee system that was improperly built and 
maintained.4 The citizens of New Orleans quickly identified the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps” or “Corps”), the federal agency charged 
with maintaining and operating the levee system that protects New Orleans, as the 
culprit.5 
Shortly thereafter, New Orleanians began displaying the slogan “Hold the 
Corps Accountable” on t-shirts and yard signs.6 Citizens openly blamed the Army 
Corps in conversations about the storm.7 Many believed that the Army Corps 
should be held liable for much of the damage caused by the failure of the levees.8 
Those who felt this way were quickly disappointed to learn that, traditionally, 
governments have escaped liability to their own citizens through the long-held 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
For nearly two centuries, American citizens were de facto precluded from 
suing the federal government for traditional torts.9 This changed in the middle of 
the twentieth century when Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA).10 Prior to the passage of the FTCA, the federal courts were not involved 
                                                        
2
 Taraka Anada, Comment, The Perfect Storm, An Imperfect Response, and A Sovereign Shield: 
Can Hurricane Katrina Victims Bring Negligence Claims Against the Government?, 35 PEPP. L. 
REV. 279, 281-383 (2008). 
3
 See Joseph B. Treaster and Kate Zernike, Hurricane Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens are Dead, 
N.Y. TIMES, August 30, 2005, at A1 (largely blaming the damage and death caused by the storm in 
New Orleans on the hurricane’s 100 mile per hour winds and 15 foot storm surge).  
4
 See John Schwartz, Engineers Faulted on Hurricane System, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A13 
(reporting that the levee system originally designed was very different from the one the Corps 
ultimately built); see also John Schwartz, Army Builders Accept Blame Over Flooding, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 2006, at A1. 
5
 See id. 
6
 See Michael Abromowitv & Peter Whoriskey, New Orleans Honors Its Dead, WASH. POST, Aug. 
30, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/29/AR2006082900515.html.  
7
 See e.g. David Corn, Harry Shear v. the Army Corps of Engineers, MOTHER JONES, Aug. 28, 
2010, available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/08/harry-shearer-army-corps-
engineers-hurricane-katrina-documentary (discussing a documentary by a New Orleans citizen 
that openly blames the Army Corps for levee failures in the city).  
8
 See Leslie Eaton, New Orleans Files Claim Against Corps for Billions, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 
2007, at A12 (reporting that the city and thousands of residents were seeking compensation from 
the Army Corps of Engineers for losses due to Hurricane Katrina). 
9
 See infra subpart I(A), at 5-8. 
10
 See Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
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in tort claims against the federal government.11 If the federal government harmed 
one of its own citizens, the only remedy was to petition Congress to pass a bill 
providing relief.12 After the passage of the FTCA, citizens were permitted to sue 
the federal government in a federal court in tort.13 
Theoretically, under the FTCA, the citizens of New Orleans could sue the 
federal government for negligent construction and maintenance of levees that 
failed during Hurricane Katrina. In the case of flooding in New Orleans, it was 
more complicated because the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) specifically 
indemnified the federal government for flooding damage related to the 
construction of levees.14 Specifically § 702(c) of the FCA was enacted in response 
to massive flooding that occurred along the Mississippi River in 1927.15 The flood 
caused more than $200 million in property damage (approximately $2.6 billion in 
2012 dollars adjusted for inflation), accounted for nearly 200 deaths, and left 
700,000 people homeless. 16  To prevent a similar level of devastation from 
happening in the future, the federal government implemented a massive flood 
control initiative. 17  Congress included the construction of a levee system to 
protect the City of New Orleans in the flood control measures.18 
This massive undertaking by the federal government created fear among 
some members of Congress. Legislators saw the potential for a surge of litigation 
against the United States in the event that another flood overwhelmed the 
government-maintained system. 19  Representative Bertrand Snell of New York 
stated, “I for one do not want to open up a situation that will cause thousands of 
lawsuits for damages against the Federal Government [sic] for the next 10, 20, or 
50 years.”20 
In order to indemnify the government from lawsuits, thereby allowing the 
government to get into the business of flood control, Congress included § 702(c) 
in the FCA. This section provides that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or 
rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters in 
                                                        
11
 See infra subpart I(A), at 5-8. 
12
 See Id. 
13
 See Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
14
 33 U.S.C.A. § 702c (West) 
15
 Kent C. Hofman, An Enduring Anachronism: Arguments for the Repeal of the § 702(c) 
Immunity Provision of the Flood Control Act of 1928, 79 TEX. L. REV. 791, 793 (2001); see S. 
REP. NO. 70-619, at 12 (1928) (discussing the devastation caused by the flood). 
16
 See S. REP. NO. 70-619, at 12 (1928). 
17
 See Hofman, supra note 15, at 793. 
18
 See David M. Stein, Flood of Litigation: Theories of Liability of Government Entities for 
Damages Resulting from Levee Breaches, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1341, 1338-39 (2006) (discussing that 
the New Orleans levee system was included in the Flood Control Act).  
19
 See 69 CONG. REC. 6640 (1928).  
20
 Id. 
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any place,”21 so long as the breached levee was constructed in relation to flood-
control activity. As a result of this legislation, the citizens of New Orleans were 
unable to sue the federal government for the negligent operation of the levee 
system, which was constructed to control flooding in the city.22 
With § 702(c) precluding suits based on failed levees built around the city, 
the citizens of New Orleans could not sue for negligent design of the levee 
system, regardless of the FTCA. The only option for the citizens of New Orleans 
was a suit under the FTCA for levee failures built along the Mississippi River 
Gulf Outlet (MRGO). MRGO is a navigational canal constructed by the Army 
Corps to create a shortcut from the Gulf of Mexico—through miles of marsh—to 
the Port of New Orleans.23 As Hurricane Katrina came ashore, the channel acted 
as a funnel directing Katrina’s storm surge into the levee system and ultimately 
causing multiple breaches. 24  Since MRGO is a navigational channel—not 
constructed for the purpose of flood-control activity—the FCA does not apply.25 
Without the shield of § 702(c) of the FCA, citizens of New Orleans who suffered 
property damage due to levee failures caused by water surging through MRGO 
should have been free to sue the Army Corps.26 Any successful suit, however, 
would have to be based on the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity and 
the broad exceptions granted the government under the FTCA.27 
This Comment will analyze the FTCA and its purposes in relation to recent 
litigation concerning the operation and maintenance of MRGO. Part I will provide 
background information on sovereign immunity within the US, the FTCA, and the 
Discretionary Function Exception (DFE). Part II will review and critique the 
recent decision in In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation,28  where the court 
held that the government was shielded from liability for negligent maintenance of 
MRGO. Part III will analyze the Army Corps’ actions in the context of traditional 
tort law doctrine and will suggest that the Army Corps should be held liable. Part 
IV will conclude that federal courts have broadened the DFE such that it no 
longer achieves the original intent of Congress. 
                                                        
21
 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2012). 
22
 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F.Supp.2d 644, 699 (E.D.La. 2009).  
23
 History of MRGO, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS NEW ORLEANS DIVISION, 
http://mrgo.gov/MRGO_History.aspx (last visited January 23, 2013). 
24
 See Joby Warrick & Michael Grunwald, Investigators Link Levee Failures to Design Flaws, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1. 
25
 In re Katrina Canal Breaches, 647 F.Supp.2d at 699. 
26
 See id. at 699. 
27
 Id. at 699-701. 
28
 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION 
A. The History of Sovereign Immunity in the United States 
The concept of sovereign immunity derives from the common law maxim 
“the King can do no wrong.”29 The essential notion is that it is a contradiction of 
the King’s sovereignty to allow him to be sued in his own courts.30 In the context 
of a monarchy, this makes sense because the King is all-powerful and his subjects 
must bend to his will. However, in our constitutional democracy, the power of the 
sovereign is derived directly from the people, and the judicial limitation on suits 
against the federal government creates tension between two elements of 
constitutionalism: government accountability and the need to shield the 
government from limitless tort litigation. 31  As Professor Vicki Jackson has 
written: 
On the one hand, constitutionalism entails a commitment that 
government should be limited by law and accountable . . . for the 
protection of fundamental rights; if the “essence of civil liberty” is 
that the law provide remedies for violations of rights, immunizing 
government from ordinary remedies is in considerable tension with 
all but the most formalist understandings of law and rights.32 
How this monarchist doctrine survived in our representative democracy 
remains rather obscure.33 But, there is no doubt that sovereign immunity remains 
a part of American jurisprudential theory. As Justice Holmes said, “there can be 
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right 
depends.”34 Initially, sovereign immunity was expressed as a denial of a right to 
sue.35 However, the mere denial of a right evolved into a substantive immunity 
when the Supreme Court held that the federal government was immune from all 
liability in tort.36 
                                                        
29
 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND 




 See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial 
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 521 (2003). 
32Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1809)). 
33
 SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 29, at 638. 
34
 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). 
35
 Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269; see SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 29, at 638. 
36
 See SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 29, at 638. 
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It remains a matter of scholarly debate whether or not the Founding Fathers 
accepted sovereign immunity at the time of the drafting of the U.S. Constitution.37 
Nevertheless, it has been accepted by the Supreme Court that “[w]hen the 
Constitution was ratified, it was well established in English law that the crown 
could not be sued without consent in its courts.” 38  This understanding of 
American legal history is supported by the historical record, which shows that 
many esteemed Founders endorsed the concept of sovereign immunity. 
In Federalist No. 81, Alexander Hamilton wrote, “[i]t is inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its 
consent.”39 The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Marshall, calmed 
the fears of the Virginia Delegation during ratification by saying “[i]t is not 
rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court.”40 
Arguably, recognition of sovereign immunity, at least at the state level, was 
essential to the ratification of the Constitution. 
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946, which 
waived the Government’s immunity for certain tort actions, it was “a well settled 
rule of law that the government [was] not liable for the nonfeasances or 
misfeasances or negligence of its officers, and that the only remedy to the injured 
party in such cases is by appeal to Congress.”41 The injured party’s appeal to 
Congress for a redress of grievances meant requesting that a private bill be 
enacted providing relief from the government’s harmful action. Since appealing to 
Congress was the only method of seeking justice, Congress was quickly inundated 
with requests.42 As a result, Congress became an adjudicator for a variety of 
claims filed against the United States.43 
John Quincy Adams, as a member of Congress, complained about the 
private bill process, writing, “[i]t is judicial business, and legislative assemblies 
ought to have nothing to do with it. One–half of the time of Congress is consumed 
                                                        
37
 Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 
439, 443 (2005). 
38
 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999). 
39
 THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis in 
original). 
40
 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 555 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Lenox Hill Pub. & Dist. Co. 
1974) (1836). 
41
 German Bank v. United States, 148 U.S. 573, 579 (1893). 
42
 William G. Weaver & Thomas Longoria, Bureaucracy that Kills: Federal Sovereign Immunity 
and the Discretionary Function Exception, 96 AM. POLITICAL SCI. REV. 335, 340 (2002) (noting 
that an 1848 House report on private bills in the previous decade showed 16,573 private bills 
introduced). 
43
 See Id. at 340-41. 
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by it, and there is no common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided.”44 
In response, the legislature created the Court of Claims in 1855, which provided a 
judicial forum in Congress for some claims against the United States.45 However, 
members of Congress shared the view of John Quincy Adams and objected to 
their involvement with private claims.46 
By the twentieth century, the process for dealing with private claims was 
well established but tedious and inefficient.47 Congress was not able to effectively 
decide tort claims on their merits.48 Service on the Committee of Claims, which 
was responsible for determining government liability, was considered arduous 
because careful consideration could not be given to the thousands of claims 
submitted to Congress.49 For decades, Congress debated various proposals for a 
general tort claims act that would remove the burden of contending with private 
bills.50 
B. The Federal Tort Claims Act 
The private bill system was eliminated in 1946 when Congress passed the 
FTCA as Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act.51 The FTCA’s grant of 
jurisdiction states that 
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil 
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, 
accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of 
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or 
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government 
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under 
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would 
                                                        
44
 8 JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS 
DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848 480 (Charles Francis Adams, ed., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1874). 
 
45
 See Weaver & Longoria, supra note 42, at 340-41.  
46
 PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 6 (2012). 
47
 See Weaver & Longoria, supra note 42, at 340-41.  
48
 See James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification 
and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1888-92 (2010); 
see also Adams, supra note 44, at 480. 
49
 See Tort Claims: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Bills to Provide for the Adjustment of 
Certain Torts Claims Against the United States Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary 77th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 49-55 (1942) (“Criticisms by Congressmen of Existing Procedure of Relief by Private Claim 
Bills”). 
50
 FIGLEY, supra note 46, at 7.  
51
 Pub. L. No. 79-753, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
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be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred.52 
This waiver of the long-held doctrine of sovereign immunity appears on its 
face to be astounding. The FTCA not only waived sovereign immunity, but also 
subjected the federal government to the common law of torts in the state where 
the alleged wrong occured as long as the redress sought was monetary. 
However, the waiver of sovereign immunity provided by the FTCA was not 
limitless. Congress provided for several statutory exceptions that preclude the 
liability of the federal government in tort. Examples of these exceptions include 
“[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military . . . during time 
of war,” 53  “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the 
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system,”54 and “[a]ny claim for 
damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine by the United 
States.”55 These exceptions are very specific and were designed to prevent the 
federal government from being sued while performing essential governmental 
duties. 
The broadest exception is referred to as the Discretionary Function 
Exception and it shields the federal government from 
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or 
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused.56 
These exceptions function to reassert sovereign immunity when a court 
determines that the harmful act at issue falls within the exception’s scope. The 
result is the immediate dismissal of the claim.57 The exceptions protect not only 
the United States from suit, but also individual governmental actors.58 Once the 
                                                        
52
 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)(2006). 
53
 Id. § 2680(j). 
54
 Id. § 2680(i). 
55
 Id. § 2680(f). 
56
 Id. § 2680(a). 
57
 Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, Immunity for “Discretionary” Functions: A Proposal to Amend the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 421 (2012). 
58
 See, e.g., Robert D. Lee, Jr., Federal Employees, Torts, and the Westfall Act of 1988, 56 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 334 (1996). 
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suit has been dismissed, the party’s only option is to seek redress directly from 
Congress, making them no better off than they were prior to the FTCA.59 
1. Interpreting the Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception – Dalehite v. 
United States 
In the years following the enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the 
Court left open the question of what conduct fell within the scope of the DFE.60 
The FTCA provided a broad waiver of immunity with exceptions in very specific 
circumstances. 61  It appeared initially that the Supreme Court would take a 
conservative approach to the DFE, believing that courts should not expand the 
exceptions through statutory construction.62 The Supreme Court therefore would 
permit claims brought against the federal government as long as the exceptions in 
the statute did not preclude them.63 
Dalehite v. United States64 was the first in a series of cases that contributed 
to modern DFE jurisprudence. The litigation in Dalehite was brought about by the 
Texas City disaster in 1947. As a result of famine after World War II, the United 
States Government began the production and distribution of explosive-grade 
fertilizer to Europe.65 While sitting in port waiting to be shipped to Europe, three 
thousand tons of fertilizer exploded injuring three thousand people, killing at least 
581, and destroying the harbor.66 The district court found for the plaintiffs on the 
theory that the government was negligent “in drafting and adopting the fertilizer 
export plan as a whole,” in failing to properly supervise the loading of the 
fertilizer, and for negligent manufacture.67 After the appellate court reversed, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to consider the scope of the DFE.68 
Justice Reed’s opinion upheld the appellate court’s ruling that the DFE 
precluded the government from liability. He began by turning to the legislative 
history to assess Congressional intent in drafting the FTCA.69 Justice Reed stated 
that the DFE’s purpose was to ensure that the bill protected “the Government 
against tort liability for errors in the administration or in the exercise of 
                                                        
59
 See Id. 
60
 See Lawrence Kaminski, Comment, Torts – Application of Discretionary Function Exception of 
Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 88, 88 (discussing the puzzlement over scope of the 
Discretionary Function Exception). 
61
 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a), (f), (i), (j) (2006). 
62




 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
65
 Id. at 19-20. 
66
 Bruno, supra note 57, at 424.  
67
 Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 23. 
68
 See id. at 17. 
69
 See id. at 24-30. 
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discretionary functions.” 70  He then stated, “it was not contemplated that the 
Government should be subject to liability arising from acts of a governmental 
nature or function.”71  Providing his own definition for how broadly the DFE 
should be applied, he said that it 
includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also 
includes determinations made by executives and administrators in 
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operation. Where 
there is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion. 
It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out the 
operations of government in accordance with official directions 
cannot be actionable.72 
In his view, the DFE was very broad and covered not only high-level 
planning, but also the implementation of those plans by low-level bureaucrats. 
Justice Jackson wrote a sharp dissent, arguing that this manmade disaster 
was “caused by forces set in motion by the government, [and] completely 
controlled or controllable by it.” 73  He started by pointing out that the civil 
damages action was “one of the law’s most effective inducements to the 
watchfulness and prudence necessary to avoid calamity from hazardous 
operations in the midst of an unshielded populace.” 74  In his view, a broad 
interpretation of the DFE would allow the government to “clothe official 
carelessness [in] a public interest.”75 
One consideration for Justice Jackson was that because the government 
knew that the fertilizer was explosive, there was a duty to protect the public.76 
Arguing essentially that the government was in a better position to prevent the 
injury than the general public was, he said, “[w]here experiment or research is 
necessary to determine the presence or degree of danger, the product must not be 
tried out on the public, nor must the public be expected to possess the facilities or 
technical knowledge to learn for itself of . . . dangers.”77 Justice Jackson was 
concerned that precluding the government from liability would not appropriately 
discourage risky behavior.78  
                                                        
70
 Id. at 26-27. 
71
 Id. at 28. 
72
 Id. at 35-36. 
73
 Id. at 48. 
74
 Id. at 49. 
75
 Id. at 50. 
76




 See id.  
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Justice Jackson then clarified his position by arguing that the DFE was 
meant to apply to governmental officials and agencies when they are performing 
work that is governmental in nature.79 His example was that of an attorney general 
who could not be held liable for false arrest even when a private person would.80 
However, government officials frequently “deal only with the housekeeping side 
of federal activities.”81 In these cases, he said, “there is no good reason to stretch 
the legislative text to immunize the Government or its officers from responsibility 
for their acts if done without appropriate care for the safety of others.”82  He 
concluded by saying that if the DFE is to be read as broadly as the majority had 
read it, then “the ancient and discredited doctrine that ‘The King can do no 
wrong’ has not been uprooted; it has been merely amended to read, ‘The King can 
do only little wrongs.’”83 
It would be another three decades before the Supreme Court ruled on the 
DFE again.84 In the meantime, the lower federal courts struggled to adjudicate the 
DFE, because the scope was unclear.85 
The Supreme Court provided some clarity in Berkovitz v. United States.86 In 
Berkovitz, Justice Marshall offered a two-prong test for judges interpreting the 
DFE. First, the judge must determine whether “the action is a matter of choice for 
the [Government] employee.”87 This step is required because the language of the 
exception states that the Government’s conduct must involve discretion.88 If the 
authorizing source for the government mandates a particular course of action, then 
there is no discretion to act otherwise.89 Therefore, a finding that the government 
failed to perform a mandated activity leaves the challenged act outside the scope 
of the DFE and the suit against the government can proceed. 
However, after the court finds under the first prong that the government did 
have discretion in choosing a course of action, the court must analyze the second 
prong of the test.90 In this case, the judge must determine “whether the allegedly 
tortious decision was ‘based on considerations of public policy’” 91  or 
                                                        
79










 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988). 
85
 See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Liability in 
Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 880 (1991).  
86
 Berkovitz, 486 U.S. 531. 
87
 Id. at 536. 
88
 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006) (DFE immunity applies to “any claim . . . based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty”). 
89
 Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 
90
 Id. at 537. 
91
 Id. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2014 
 
 314
“incorporates considerable ‘policy judgment.’”92 If the decision falls into either 
category, then the DFE applies and the suit should be dismissed.93  
One remaining question after Berkovitz was whether the government had to 
show that the decision to take the challenged action was actually the result of 
policy analysis. The Supreme Court clarified this point in United States vs. 
Gaubert.94  In Gaubert, the Court feared “a full-scale trial in every case that 
involves the raising of the defense of [the DFE].”95  The Court held that the 
Government did not have to show actual policy analysis but rather could show 
that the decision could have been the result of policy analysis. Justice White wrote 
that “[t]he focus of the inquiry is not on the agent’s subjective intent in exercising 
the discretion . . . but on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are 
susceptible to policy analysis.”96 It is within this framework of FTCA and DFE 
interpretation that the citizens of New Orleans would have to operate in their 
attempt to hold the Army Corps accountable for losses sustained due to the failure 
of the levees. 
II. THE CITIZENS SPEAK: IN RE: KATRINA CANAL BREACHES LITIGATION 
A. The Construction and Maintenance of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 
In 1943, Congress requested a report from the Secretary of the Army on the 
viability of building a shipping channel from the Gulf of Mexico to the Port of 
New Orleans.97 Congress had two good reasons to request the report. First, the 
Government realized during World War II that the Port of New Orleans, 
Mississippi River, and the Gulf of Mexico played an important role in the 
deployment of military supplies.98 For national security reasons, the Government 
wanted to increase the efficiency of supply routes at the Port of New Orleans, 
which were “overtaxed” during the war. 99  The second reason was purely 
economical. By decreasing the distance from the port to the Gulf, the maritime 
industry would save a significant amount of money.100 
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On September 25, 1951, the Chief of Engineers for the US Army sent the 
completed report to the House of Representatives for review. 101  The report 
recommended the construction of a deep draft channel on the east side of the 
Mississippi River connecting New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico.102 The Chief of 
Engineers instructed that the channel was to be 36 feet deep and 500 feet wide 
near the city, and would gradually expand to 38 feet deep and 600 feet wide near 
the Gulf.103 It was stipulated that construction should be done “in accordance with 
the plans of the division engineer and with such modifications . . . in the 
discretion” of the Secretary of the Army acting through the Chief Engineer.104 
The Army Corps knew, however, that the channel would need maintenance 
because of the fragile geography of Southeastern Louisiana, created by wetlands 
and swamp. One issue was the need for foreshore protection105 along the banks of 
MRGO due to wave wash.106 On its way to New Orleans, MRGO cut through 
“virgin coastal wetlands,”107 which were largely composed of “fat clay.” Fat clay 
is fine gray clay that contains a lot of water, making it susceptible to lateral 
displacement108  and withering away. Without protection, the banks of MRGO 
would gradually widen overtime. During Hurricane Katrina, the widened channel 
created a “funnel effect” and intensified the velocity of each surge of water into 
the New Orleans levee system.109 Some estimates show that this increased the 
initial storm surge into New Orleans by twenty percent.110 
As early as 1958, the Army Corps recognized that this type of soil would 
“displace laterally under fairly light load.”111 The Army Corps was also aware 
that due to wave wash interacting with the fat clay, the channel would gradually 
widen. The Army Corps wrote, 
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erosion due to wave wash in open areas can be expected . . . where 
the peat and highly organic clays are exposed. Protection for this 
area can be provided if and when the need for it becomes 
necessary. No channel protection is included in the overall cost 
estimate.112 
Thus, the Army Corps was aware that eventually MRGO would require 
additional protection to prevent wave wash from widening its banks. In addition, 
without adequate protection, excavation, and dredging, the intrusion of saltwater 
would cause erosion of the banks of MRGO.113 MRGO was completed in 1968,114 
but foreshore protection was not added until 1986.115 By the time protection was 
built for MRGO, it had grown to an average of 1,970 feet wide, nearly three times 
its original design width.116 
The expansion allowed by the Army Corps had three consequences. First, 
the lateral displacement caused a reduction in the height of the levees along 
MRGO that made them more susceptible to breaching.117 Judge Duvall likened 
the reduction in levee height to the Greek myth of Sisyphus118 stating, 
the channel was dug through soil that has a known propensity to 
laterally displace . . . . The soil removed from the channel was 
placed on the west bank of the MRGO placing weight or “loading” 
the marsh. In turn, that action would cause [fat clay] to slough back 
into the channel which would then require it to be dredged again, 
creating a never ending cycle which significantly contributed to the 
sinking of the MRGO Levee.119 
As a result, by the time Hurricane Katrina came ashore, the levee along 
MRGO had decreased to approximately 1.5 feet below its design target.120 
The second consequence of the increased width of MRGO was berm 
reduction.121 The increasing width of MRGO caused the berm to reduce from an 
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average of 500 feet to approximately 200 to 300 feet. 122 The reduction in distance 
of the berm made breaching more probable because it contributed to the reduction 
in levee height.123 
Finally, the increased width of MRGO caused a greater “fetch.”124 Fetch is 
defined as “the width of open water that the wind blows over to affect the motion 
of the water.”125 The wave height created by Katrina was a function of the depth 
of the water and the impact of the winds on the fetch.126 The greater the fetch, the 
more powerful the storm surge as a hurricane comes on shore. Since MRGO had 
grown to nearly three times its design width, a significantly larger fetch was 
created. As a result, the intensity of the wave strength that attacked the MRGO 
levees was similarly increased, which made the levees more susceptible to 
breaching.127 
B. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation: The District Court 
Finds the Government Liable Under the FTCA 
The Plaintiffs in Katrina Canal Breaches filed negligence actions against 
the United States of America and the United States Army Corps of Engineers 
under the FTCA’s waiver of immunity. The heart of the complaint was that the 
Army Corps of Engineers was liable for damage because MRGO was negligently 
“designed, constructed, and maintained.” 128  According to the complaint, the 
injury to the Plaintiff’s resulted from “one of the most predictable and preventable 
catastrophes in American History.”129 
In an opinion that spanned ninety-three pages of the Federal Reporter, 
Judge Stanwood Duvall, a federal district court judge in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, began by recounting the history and maintenance of MRGO.130 Judge 
Duvall then concluded that the Army Corps of Engineers’ negligence in 
maintaining MRGO was a “substantial cause” of the breaching of certain levees 
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during the storm.131 He went on to say, “[t]his court is utterly convinced that the 
Corps’ failure to provide timely foreshore protection doomed [MRGO] to grow to 
two to three times its design width.” 132  The increased width, he concluded, 
destroyed banks that would have helped the levee withstand the hurricane and 
added fetch that created a more forceful attack on the levee.133 
Having found the Army Corps negligent, the next step was to address the 
FCA and the exceptions to the FTCA. Judge Duvall quickly rejected the 
Government’s contention that it was immune based on § 702(c) of the FCA.134 
According to Judge Duvall, the failure to provide foreshore protection did not 
concern flood control activity. 135  Highlighting the original “Design 
Memorandum,” he noted that the Army Corps’ decisions were made in the 
context of the MRGO project—construction of a shipping channel.136 Therefore, § 
702(c) did not apply because none of the decisions involved flood-control 
activity.137 
The Government sought immunity from liability under the FTCA’s Due 
Care Exception and the DFE.138 Like the DFE, the Due Care Exception is found 
in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 139  In order to show immunity under the Due Care 
Exception, the Government was required to show that 1) the authorization to build 
MRGO mandated a particular course of action, and 2) if there was a mandate, 
show that due care was taken during execution.140 In applying this test, Judge 
Duvall found that the Due Care Exception did not apply.141 
In so finding, Judge Duvall distinguished design and construction of MRGO 
from maintenance and operation. He wrote, 
[A]s concerned the initial design and construction of MRGO, these 
actions were shielded by the [DFE]. . . . [T]here was no violation 
of any mandate . . . . However, with respect to the issue of the 
maintenance and operation of the MRGO . . . [t]he Corps’ mandate 
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was to create, dredge and maintain a deep-draft channel [that] . . . 
was to be 36 feet deep and 500 feet wide, increasing . . . to 38 feet 
deep and 600 feet wide. Nothing was presented at trial that . . . 
with this mandate, the Corps was also given the latitude to allow 
the channel to multiply in width . . . . This grant did not and could 
not have given the Corps the ability to ignore the unbridled growth 
of [MRGO].142 
The finding of a mandate to maintain MRGO at its design parameters 
makes logical sense. It would be an odd result to hold that Congress would 
authorize the building of a sixty-six mile channel at certain dimensions, but not 
require the maintenance of that channel at those same dimensions. Thus, Judge 
Duvall concluded that there was a mandate for the Army Corps to maintain 
MRGO at its design dimensions and “[d]ue care was clearly absent,”143 so the 
Due Care Exception was not available to the Government. 
The finding of a mandate to maintain and operate MRGO within its original 
design functions should have been dispositive to the question of whether the DFE 
applied. As Judge Duvall correctly stated, the Supreme Court in Gaubert 
established a two-part test to determine whether the DFE applies.144 The first 
inquiry requires that the challenged act must involve an element of judgment.145 If 
a statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a course of action (i.e. contains a 
mandate) then the employees acting on behalf of the government have no choice 
but to adhere to it. 146  If Judge Duvall found while analyzing the Due Care 
Exception that the “Corps’ mandate was to create, dredge, and maintain a deep-
draft channel [that] . . . was to be 36 feet deep and 500 feet wide, increasing . . . to 
38 feet deep and 600 feet wide,”147 then the government had no choice but to 
ensure that the channel did not widen. Eliminating the first prong of the Gaubert 
test, Judge Duvall should have ruled that the DFE did not apply.148 
One possible response is that Judge Duvall was only referring to a mandate 
to construct MRGO within those dimensions. However, Judge Duvall explicitly 
states that there is a difference between the construction and design (for which he 
found no mandate to build foreshore protection) and maintenance and 
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operation.149 The mandate to maintain MRGO necessarily must include keeping it 
within reasonable dimensions. It would be hard to imagine a mandate to maintain 
a navigational channel that allowed the channel to nearly triple in width. The 
failure of the Army Corps to adhere to this mandate causes the government’s use 
of the DFE to collapse. 
Another possible rejoinder is that there was no mandate concerning how the 
Army Corps was to ensure that MRGO’s expansion be controlled. Therefore, the 
Army Corps had some discretion in maintaining MRGO. This argument, 
however, puts the cart before the horse. If the Army Corps had a mandate to 
maintain the channel at a certain width, it does not matter how it was to be 
accomplished. It only matters that the channel width be maintained. Once it has 
been determined that there was a mandate to maintain MRGO’s dimensions, the 
Army Corps “ha[d] no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.”150 
Judge Duvall’s analysis of the first prong of the DFE did not recognize his 
previous conclusion that the Army Corps had a mandate to maintain MRGO 
within its original design specifications. While Judge Duvall did not find for the 
plaintiffs based on negligent maintenance, he did rule for the plaintiffs by 
focusing on the Army Corps’ failure to prepare impact statements under the 
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).151 NEPA requires all agencies of 
the federal government to “include in every recommendation or report on 
proposals for legislation and other Federal actions significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement” on various impacts the 
proposed action would have on the environment.152  Because the Army Corps 
failed to provide such reports, Judge Duvall ruled that the DFE was not available 
to the Army Corps.153 
Judge Duvall also ruled in the plaintiff’s favor under the second prong of 
Gaubert ruling that the decision not to provide foreshore protection was not 
policy based, but was the result of “[t]echnical, [e]ngineering, and [p]rofessional 
[j]udgments.” 154  Here, Duvall essentially argued that the failure to provide 
protection could not have been a policy decision because the Army Corps 
admitted that it did not think MRGO created an additional hazard during a 
hurricane.155  Since they were unaware that MRGO would create a hazardous 
condition during a hurricane, their failure to provide protection was based on an 
erroneous scientific judgment, not on policy.156 Indeed, Judge Duvall referred to a 
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lower court case to support the proposition that, “‘engineering judgment’ [is] not 
a ‘matter of policy’ or an ‘exercise of policy judgment.’”157 
In rejecting the government’s use of the DFE, Judge Duvall commented on 
the broadness of the government’s position and of the DFE in general:  
the Government’s position is . . . overly broad—that is that all [of 
the Corps’] actions taken implicate[] the Government’s policy with 
respect to maintenance of the MRGO. . . . In the event the Corps’ 
monumental negligence here would somehow be regarded as 
“policy” then the exception would be an amorphous 
incomprehensible defense without any discernable contours.158 
Thus, Judge Duvall rejected the government’s use of the DFE because to 
allow the government to use the DFE in this context would render the waiver of 
sovereign immunity meaningless in the most important cases. As Justice Jackson 
warned in Dalehite, an expansive application of the DFE does not waive 
sovereign immunity in the most egregious case, but waives it only in the most 
trivial.159 
C. In re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation: The Appellate 
Court’s Arbitrary Decisions and Faulty Reasoning 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied a de novo standard of review to the 
district court’s finding.160 Initially, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding that the government negligently maintained MRGO by failing to provide 
timely foreshore protection.161 However, in a rather bizarre turn of events several 
months later, the Fifth Circuit reversed its initial finding. Unfortunately, it is 
unclear why the Fifth Circuit made such a stark reversal. The revised opinion 
relied on conclusory statements with little legal analysis. 
Judge Jerry Smith’s affirming opinion, released on March 2, 2012, 
addressed the three arguments analyzing the DFE.162  First, he disagreed with 
Judge Duvall’s analysis of the first prong of Berkovitz, arguing that NEPA was a 
procedural statute that did not mandate particular results.163 Under NEPA, the 
government is allowed to undertake projects destructive to the environment as 
long as the agency studies and disseminates information about the environmental 
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consequences.164 The statute only mandates the process that must be taken.165 The 
ultimate decision to act upon information provided by NEPA would have rested 
with the Army Corps.166 Thus, Judge Smith found that “[a]t most the Corps ha[d] 
abused its discretion [in deciding not to act on the information]—an abuse 
explicitly immunized by the DFE.”167 
On appeal, the plaintiffs directly addressed Judge Duvall’s finding that the 
Army Corps violated a mandate to maintain MRGO within its design 
specifications.168 Judge Smith’s analysis of the first prong of Berkovitz was thus 
forced to deal with this issue. The government argued that because a previous 
plan during the construction phase of MRGO anticipated some erosion, the Fifth 
Circuit should find no maintenance mandate existed.169 The plaintiffs responded 
by citing government documents identifying the authorized channel width as 500 
feet and referencing Judge Duvall’s finding that Congress did not allow the 
expansion of MRGO. 170  Judge Smith found for the United States in two 
paragraphs with limited reasoning. He wrote that although MRGO nearly tripled 
in size, 
[t]he district court recognized . . . that the design for MRGO 
expressly contemplated erosion from wave wash and did not 
provide for armoring the banks. [Judge Duvall] held that these 
design features were ‘shielded by the [DFE],’ a ruling . . . not 
challeng[ed] on appeal. Logically, therefore the absence of 
armoring . . . [could not] have violated a mandate sufficient to 
negate the first Berkovitz prong.”171 
At best, Judge Smith’s analysis shows that he did not understand the issue. 
Judge Smith failed to recognize Judge Duvall’s explicit differentiation between 
design and maintenance of MRGO. These two concepts are not the same; indeed, 
they are mutually exclusive. Failing to provide for foreshore protection at the 
design phase is not equivalent to the failure to maintain MRGO within its design 
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specifications. The simple fact that Judge Duvall found that the DFE applied to 
the design of MRGO does not “logically” require that it apply to the failure to 
maintain the channel. In Judge Smith’s defense, the plaintiffs could have provided 
a more forceful and affirmative argument on this point. A reading of the brief 
leaves those who believe this argument to be the most powerful wanting.  
Finally, Judge Smith addressed the argument raised by the plaintiffs that the 
DFE does not shield the Government under the second prong of Berkovitz. 
Addressing the question of whether or not the decision not to armor MRGO was 
susceptible to policy analysis or “involves only the application of scientific 
principles,”172 Judge Smith found the latter.173 Relying, in part, on a 1958 Army 
Corps design memorandum, Judge Smith found that “the Corps labored under the 
mistaken scientific belief that the MRGO would not increase storm surge 
risks.”174 He then pointed to the United States’ own words at oral argument in the 
district court to the same effect. There the United States argued that the Army 
Corps “determined that MRGO played no role in major hurricane events . . . [and] 
for that reason, the Corps saw no reason” to address armoring.175 
Judge Smith continued in his criticism over the government’s position that 
the decision was policy based saying it was “[a]gainst the considerable 
evidence.”176 Pointing to a quote by the Government arguing that the Army Corps 
failed to provide protection because they were protecting scarce resources, Judge 
Smith said “[t]his . . . is the closest the government comes to arguing that it had 
policy reasons—and not faulty scientific ones—for delaying MRGO’s 
armoring.”177 He finished by saying, “[t]his is not a situation where the Corps 
recognized a risk and chose not to mitigate it out of concern from some other 
public policy []; it flatly failed to gauge the risk.”178 Accordingly, Judge Smith 
held that the government’s claim to immunity under the DFE failed the second 
prong of Berkovitz and immunity did not apply.179 
This victory for the plaintiffs was short-lived. On September 24, 2012, six 
months and twenty-two days after finding that the DFE did not immunize the 
Government from suit, the Fifth Circuit abruptly withdrew the previous 
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opinion.180  Judge Smith’s opinion reversing the finding for the plaintiffs was 
identical to the opinion that previously found the government liable except that 
the seven paragraphs in the affirming opinion that convincingly argued that the 
Army Corps’ decisions were not policy based were deleted. In their place, Judge 
Smith added three paragraphs which started by stating “[a]s discussed above, 
there is ample record evidence indicating the public-policy character of the Corps’ 
various decisions contributing to the delay in armoring [MRGO].”181 
When read together with the March 2012 opinion affirming the district 
court, the September 2012 opinion is confusing, unprincipled, and lacks reasoned 
analysis. The most obvious source of puzzlement is trying to discern a principled 
reason why the court made such a stark reversal. It is as though the final portion 
of the opinion dealing with prong two of Berkovitz was written by a different 
court. 
The pendulum swung from “the Corps decisions were grounded on an 
erroneous scientific judgment, not policy considerations” 182  to “[t]he Corps’ 
actual reasons for the delay are varied and sometimes unknown, but . . . the 
decisions here were susceptible to policy considerations.”183 This recognition of 
the Gaubert “susceptible to policy judgment” analysis is misguided. As the court 
points out, “[i]f [the decision to not armor MRGO] is susceptible only to the 
application of scientific principles . . . [the Government] is not immune [from 
suit].”184 In the March opinion, the court made it perfectly clear that the failure to 
armor MRGO was only based on scientific principles.185 
In the first opinion, the court spent 7 paragraphs and 968 words (compared 
to the same section in the new opinion that was 3 paragraphs and 354 words long 
where the court rejected its court’s own reasoning in March) arguing that the 
Government had not even shown it was aware that there was an issue regarding 
foreshore protection.186 Indeed the court recognized that “plaintiffs can defeat the 
presumption [of susceptibility to policy analysis] by showing, as a matter of fact, 
that the government's actual decision was not a policy-based one.”187 In March, 
the court was certain that the plaintiffs had done just that.188 
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Furthermore, the court stated that “although the Corps appears to have 
appreciated the benefit of foreshore protection . . . it also had reason to consider 
alternatives [for preventing channel widening].189 Thus, the court now believed 
the decision was susceptible to policy analysis and was shielded by the DFE 
under Gaubert. 
This analysis is problematic for two reasons. First, as already noted,190 it 
does not matter what measures the Army Corps decided or did not decide to 
undertake to prevent the banks of MRGO from widening. What matters is that the 
Army Corps violated its mandate to maintain the channel at its design 
specifications. The court presented no analysis of how the Army Corps overcame 
this initial hurdle. 
Second, at oral argument, the Army Corps made it clear that they took no 
steps to remediate the dangers posed by MRGO because they did not know any 
dangers existed.191 If the decision to do nothing to prevent MRGO from widening 
was susceptible to policy analysis, the implied policy analysis had nothing to do 
with dangers posed by a hurricane.192 Using this logic, the government would 
rarely be found liable for a tort. Consider an obvious case of negligence such as 
an automobile accident involving a government truck whose brakes failed due to 
lack of routine maintenance. Based on the Fifth Circuit’s logic, the government 
would only need to argue that checking the brakes and replacing them is 
susceptible to policy analysis because the driver was free to consider other ways 
of stopping the car. 193  This approach to the Gaubert policy analysis test is 
astoundingly broad. 
What is remarkable is that the court chose to simply delete its previous 
reasoning rather than justify the revision with principled analysis and logic. There 
was virtually no analysis provided in the updated opinion. The court simply 
restated the Gaubert “susceptible to policy analysis” test and indicated that the 
Army Corps’ actions passed this hurdle.194 Without any indication from the court 
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as to why it chose to take such an unprincipled stand, one can only infer that the 
court had its own policy reasons for reversing the decision.  
III. APPLYING RATIONALES FOR GOVERNMENT IMMUNITY UNDER THE 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION IN KATRINA CANAL BREACHES 
A. Congressional Intent 
The reasoning and logic in Katrina Canal Breaches raises a larger question: 
why do the federal courts interpret the DFE to provide such a broad immunity 
from suit for the United States even when negligence is shown? One reason they 
have the latitude to do so is a function of the ambiguity of the statute itself.195 The 
cost of the federal courts’ interpretation is a widening of the application of the 
DFE from what Congress originally intended.196 The legislative history shows 
that Congress intended to prohibit the FTCA from being used to sue the 
government where no negligence had been shown, and the only grounds to sue 
was that the same conduct by a non-governmental actor would be actionable.197 
Viewing the scope of the DFE with this lens, the purpose of the DFE was to 
provide a procedural advantage,198 allowing the Government to dismiss cases on 
the merits early on in the litigation if no negligence was shown.199 However, the 
Congressional reports also show that the DFE was intended to shield the United 
States from claims based on the “abuse of discretionary authority . . . whether or 
not negligence is alleged to have been involved.”200 This language tends to lean in 
the direction of a broader application of the DFE. 
The scope of the DFE remains ambiguous and open to interpretation. It has 
therefore been the charge of the federal courts to determine what activity is 
“discretionary.” As the Katrina Canal Breaches case shows, courts continue to 
struggle to define the exception’s scope and the results of the use of this immunity 
are questionable.201  
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B. Protecting the Public Purse 
It has frequently been posited that the justification underlying most 
decisions to deny liability under the DFE is protecting the treasury.202 In extreme 
situations or in the aggregate, this logic makes sense. It would be difficult to 
imagine a situation in which bankrupting the United States Treasury would be 
justified in order to compensate the victim of a government tort. One cited 
argument is that unlike many private actors, the Government “has the deepest 
pockets of all.”203 This has the practical reality of ensuring that any successful tort 
claims against the Government will be paid.204 The Government coffers, it is 
argued, are simply too tempting for lawyers seeking large fees and payouts and 
thus access must be constrained.205 
Empirical data on this subject, however, is simply not readily available.206 
Professor Harold Krent has estimated that the DFE saves “perhaps billions of 
dollars a year.”207  This number, while certainly correct as a practical matter, 
invites confusion. It is unknown whether Professor Krent is including all suits that 
have been dismissed because of the DFE or if this includes only those suits that 
may have been meritorious.208 Thus, the numbers provided by Professor Krent 
can be misleading. 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear that simply because the DFE protects 
the public purse it is therefore justified. One commentator has pointed out that it 
would also be cost effective to withhold tax refunds due to taxpayers.209 However, 
few would argue that the increased revenues to the public would justify such an 
action. The question therefore is one that turns on social policy. Is it justifiable to 
prevent government tort victims from receiving judgments because of fiscal 
concerns? This Comment takes the position that courts should not provide blanket 
immunity based on the liberal two-prong test in Berkovitz. Instead courts should 
look to the facts of each case and determine whether the denial of redress is 
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defensible given the circumstances. The current system approaches the problem 
with the proverbial axe when a scalpel is needed. 
Putting the actual dollar savings aside, this fear of fiscal annihilation may be 
overblown because an application of traditional tort law doctrine would thwart 
many tort claims against the government.210 There are many protections built into 
the FTCA other than blanket immunity that provide more narrow procedural 
mechanisms that limit liability for the government in frivolous cases. For 
example, the FTCA bars trial by jury, instead requiring cases to be tried in front 
of a federal judge.211 This blunts the fear that an emotional jury might side with 
the plaintiffs more often than the government’s perceived cold bureaucracy. 
Further protections come in the form of limiting the type of damages that 
can be collected. The FTCA caps damages available as determined by laws of the 
state where the action is brought. 212  In addition, punitive damages are 
forbidden.213 Thus, there are numerous protections, other than the broad DFE, that 
may serve to protect the government’s fiscal coffers. 
The protection of the public treasury is not the only economic consideration 
when analyzing the use of the DFE. Behavior modification is one of the chief 
rationales for finding liability in tort. Along with the enforcement of criminal 
laws, the threat of civil monetary liability is one of the chief means of controlling 
behavior.214 With respect to shaping governmental conduct, the use of monetary 
liability may be more effective.215 This is because organizations tend to act in 
more predictable and rational ways than individuals. 216  When liability is an 
available remedy, administrators in institutions are forced to consider tort liability 
before taking action.217 
Allowing liability against the government in tort is an equally plausible 
alternative to protect the treasury. It may seem counterintuitive to say that 
allowing liability against the government would protect the treasury, but the 
specter of tort liability would cause governmental institutions to reduce 
unnecessary risk taking. This, in turn, would result in fewer damage claims for 
negligent conduct. Indeed this approach would have another beneficial 
consequence: fewer citizens would be harmed by negligent conduct authorized by 
the government. 
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Opponents of this line of thinking point out that finding the government 
liable in tort may result in the government taking on fewer risky endeavors that 
benefit society.218 When private firms decide to undertake a risky project, the firm 
weighs the legal risk of having to compensate for torts with the financial benefits 
to the firm.219 If the expected value220 of the firm’s risky activity outweighs the 
cost of compensating victims, a rational firm will undertake the action and receive 
the difference in value in the form of profits. 
In contrast, a government actor typically has no profit motive.221 Public 
officials are unable to appropriate for themselves the value created by undertaking 
risky projects such as MRGO.222 Even if they could, society would likely view the 
appropriation of value as corrupt. 223  Thus, for many public officials, taking 
excessive risks in pursuit of the public good is all pain and no gain.224 
This argument, while technically correct and initially quite persuasive, 
simply misses the point. The issue in a case like Katrina Canal Breaches is not 
whether a particular official should be held accountable, but rather whether 
society should be held accountable for negligent conduct undertaken on their 
behalf. The Government vs. Plaintiff dichotomy presents a misleading choice. A 
successful suit against the government resulting in a paid judgment is really a suit 
against the citizens that the government represents as agent. 
This Comment does not argue that individual bureaucrats should be held 
personally liable for government torts. The deeper question in Katrina Canal 
Breaches is whether society is willing to sacrifice citizens injured by Hurricane 
Katrina. This Comment argues that the answer is affirmatively no. If asked, the 
Author would answer that most Americans would recognize that major 
engineering projects undertaken for the benefit of society in the form of enhanced 
military capability are done on behalf of the people. Thus, the principal should, in 
certain cases, pay for injuries that result from the negligence of the agent. 
In the wake of the district court’s decision in Katrina Canal Breaches, the 
possibility of tort liability began to affect the behavior of institutional and 
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individual actors. 225  Professionals began to consider that if damages occur 
because of environmental degradation to waterways, then liability might attach to 
those responsible for operating and maintaining those structures. 226  The 
possibility of such liability caused operators of waterways to review maintenance, 
inspections, and repairs to ensure they were not done negligently. 227  It is 
reasonable to believe that a similar effect would occur in the public sector. 
C. Economic Efficiency 
From a purely economic point of view, the DFE often produces an 
inefficient result. One notorious theory of economic efficiency that has been 
applied to tort law is the “Coase Theorem.”228 The basic concept is that when 
there are no transaction costs, it makes no difference from an efficiency 
standpoint whether the law imposes liability on the injurer (the United States in 
FTCA claims) or allows the victim to absorb the damages.229 In either case, the 
ultimate result is that the parties will negotiate to an efficient result.230 
This efficiency-centric idea is embodied in the concept that liability in tort 
should be imposed on the party in the best position to avoid the injury.231 Justice 
Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Dalehite echoed this idea when he stated that the 
public should not be required “to possess the facilities or the technical knowledge 
to learn for itself of . . . dangers.”232 Requiring the public to investigate the cargo 
of every ship in the Texas City Harbor and know the dangers involved would 
have been highly inefficient. 
Similarly, in Katrina Canal Breaches an efficiency analysis cuts in favor of 
finding the Army Corps liable. This is because engineering and construction are 
highly specialized fields. Imposing damages caused by the breaching of MRGO 
on the citizens of New Orleans places an insurmountable burden on them. Such an 
imposition would create an implication that each citizen of New Orleans is 
required to obtain information on every levee and navigational canal that may 
affect him or her during a hurricane. The burden would then be placed on them to 
understand or hire an expert to explain the risks involved in continuing to live 
within that system.  
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The more sensible approach is to place the burden of ensuring the public’s 
safety on the Army Corps. The Army Corps, having constructed and operated 
MRGO for nearly half a century, had greater access to the information and 
expertise necessary to avoid the injury. Therefore, the Army Corps’ failure to 
properly maintain the levee should result in government liability.  
D. Beyond Economics: Justice and Moral Considerations 
Focusing on the economic considerations leaves the analysis incomplete. 
The goals of tort law are too often boiled down to economic considerations.233 
Tort law, like many iterations of legal doctrine, is not static.234 The adjudication 
of tort disputes has evolved over centuries.235 The doctrinal practices of tort law 
create a framework of adjudication, which then generates critical analysis of the 
decisions made by courts. 236  These criticisms are then used to evaluate and 
change the doctrine.237 By restricting the analysis to the cold hard economic facts, 
courts interfere with this process. As a result, the adjudication of tort cases often 
leaves our intuitive need for justice between injurer and the injured unfulfilled. 
One noneconomic theory is that of corrective justice. The theory of 
corrective justice ignores the economic concept of how resources should be 
distributed among society.238 Instead, corrective justice focuses on the equities of 
the tortious transaction.239 This concept embodies the intuitive nature of tort law 
theory that compels us to recognize an injustice and seek to correct it. The very 
pursuit of justice itself is an important goal that helps to maintain our society and 
the theoretical underpinnings of the legal system.240 
The concept of corrective justice traces its origins back to Aristotle,241 and 
has as its premise achieving individual justice between an injurer and an injured 
party. 242  Corrective justice can be criticized as impractical because of its 
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theoretical nature. In our modern society, the idea that justice can be had between 
two individuals is challenged by the fact that more often than not insurance 
companies pay restitution.243 Since insurance companies ultimately pay for the 
injurer (who is only required to pay premiums) justice between the parties is not 
achievable in the sense Aristotle had in mind. 
This limited view of Aristotle is misguided. Aristotle was less concerned 
with the substantive requirements of corrective justice, such as who pays in a 
particular dispute.244 Instead, he was interested in how corrective justice fits into 
society’s larger conception of virtue.245 A consideration from this point of view is 
how a society removes unfair advantages in order to achieve a higher level of 
virtue.246 This sense of corrective justice as an element of virtue must start from 
the top; the governing state should be the first to reject unfair advantages where 
they exist.247 
From this perspective, the finding that the Army Corps was negligent 
requires the application of liability. To do otherwise would leave the scales of 
justice between the parties out of balance. The pursuit of justice itself is worth the 
economic disadvantage imposed on the government. Our legal institutions are 
dependent upon a delicate presupposition that if citizens are aggrieved, justice can 
at least be pursued. The de facto immunity granted to the government in FTCA 
claims undermines this fundamental premise in our society. 
In addition, the practical criticism that corrective justice would not be 
achieved because of insurance is alleviated. Payment for damages as a result of 
the negligent operation of MRGO would be paid directly from the coffers of the 
federal government. 
Of course, the reality is that the government only acts as an agent of the 
American people. After all, the government’s money comes from its citizens in 
the form of tax payments. It therefore could be argued that the American people 
should not be required to pay for the government’s negligence because, in a sense, 
they would be paying themselves. Closely related to corrective justice, another 
justice-based rationale for finding the government liable rests with the idea that 
responsibility in tort can be seen as community judgment for moral fault.248 Under 
this theory, the finding that the Army Corps was liable would act as a judgment 
by the American people rebuking the negligent conduct of the Army Corps. 












 Shapo, supra note 228, at 483. 
Vol. 9.2]  Christopher R. Dyess 
 
 333
Another concept of fairness and justice lies in the idea of risk and cost-
spreading.249 The central idea is that when many people benefit from an activity 
that injures only a few, the costs of the injury should be spread among those who 
benefit.250 This theory fits quite nicely with the idea of finding the Army Corps 
liable for injuries caused by MRGO. One of the original purposes of MRGO was 
to provide more efficient distribution of resources in the event of war.251 The 
Government, acting on behalf of the American people, found that it would be 
beneficial to the nation to have a shorter route from New Orleans to the Gulf of 
Mexico. The costs associated with the massive destruction caused by the 
negligent maintenance of MRGO are appropriately spread among the American 
citizens who benefited from greater access to the Port of New Orleans. 
CONCLUSION 
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath were events that forever scarred a 
nation and called into question whether or not US citizens could trust their 
government to protect them. In light of these events and the Army Corps’ 
negligence in maintaining MRGO, society should begin to question what 
Congress intended by the word “discretionary” in the DFE. Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines discretionary as: “(Of an act or duty) involving an exercise of 
judgment and choice…” 252  Only the most formalistic interpretation of this 
definition would allow the Army Corps the discretion to disregard the expansion 
of MRGO. 
Allowing the Army Corps of Engineers to escape liability for its admittedly 
negligent operation of MRGO is unjust. A doctrinal analysis of the facts as found 
by Judge Duvall and Judge Smith leads to the conclusion that the DFE should not 
apply. More importantly, the citizens of New Orleans deserve a ruling that 
recognizes the wrong committed by the Army Corps of Engineers. 
There is inherent value in the recognition of a wrong in an official forum 
such as a court of law. It provides those injured with the dignity of an official 
acknowledgment of their plight. While a monetary recovery would have rebuilt 
homes and replaced belongings, the moral recovery that may have resulted from a 
finding that the Army Corps was liable, would have helped to heal the broken 
spirit of many New Orleanians. On June 24, 2013, the Supreme Court of the 
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United States officially denied certiorari to hear the plaintiff’s appeal.253 Thus, 
the task of rehabilitating the lost trust of New Orleans in the federal government 
will now be in the hands of the United States Congress.  
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